Article

Strategic investments in accessibility under port competition and inter-regional coordination

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This paper analyzes the incentives for and welfare implications of collaboration among lo- cal governments in landside port accessibility investment. In particular, we consider two seaports with their respective captive markets and a common inland market for which the ports compete. The ports and the inland belong to three independent regional gov- ernments, each making investment decisions on accessibility for its own region. We find that there is a conflict of interest between the port governments and inland government in terms of their jointly making accessibility investment decisions, and that each region’s preference over various coalitions is highly affected by ownership type of the competing ports. For public ports, the inland may compensate the port regions to achieve the grand coalition that maximizes total welfare but requires a sizable investment in the port regions. For private ports, however, the port regions benefit from coordinating with the inland and hence may be able to compensate the inland to form the grand coalition.

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Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

Transportation Research Part B

No. Panggil

ATC PO ANG s

Penerbit

Hong Kong : Elsevier., 2016

Deskripsi Fisik

24 p.

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

0191-2615

Klasifikasi

PO

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

online resource

Edisi

-

Subjek

inland accessibility
Seaport competition
Strategic investment
Inter-regional coordination
Coalition stability

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Yulai Wan

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

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