Article
Modeling the effects of competition on seaport terminal awarding
In the maritime transport industry, a terminal concessi on often specifies the competition conditions during the concession period. This study proposes a game model with which the effects of competition for seaport terminal awards can be studied. The modeling results suggest that
(a) a terminal operator always prefers to control more terminals in the region;
(b) i fall terminal operators expand their operations to every port, they will be worse off due to an increase of inter-and intra-port competitions, asituation similar to the prisoners'dilemma; and
(c) when a port authority has significant market power, it prefers to introduce inter-and intra-port competition, rather than allowing one operator to monopolize all terminals.
(d) multiple equilibri a maybe observed in concession awarding depending on market characteristics associated to aparticular market. Anecdotal observations consistent with these modeling results are presented and discussed.