Article

The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions1

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In determining voyage charter rate, normally, the charterage is determined through the general process of negotiation with the power of the demand and supply in the market including various factors. This paper assumes that the ship-owner cannot make the contract with charterer after the end of prechartering, the delay cost per day from ship-owner will be incurred. This case can be applied to charterer as well. The purpose of this paper is to propose an equilibrium charterage which includes the delay loss cost per day in bargaining with asymmetric impatience both for the charterer and the shipowner. This paper uses Nash equilibrium theory, which aims at reducing the negotiation time, The equilibrium charterage found in Rubinstein theorem, which is made with each discount factor in surplus. In summary, this paper analyzes the delay loss cost per ton and per day between the charterer and the ship-owner, by determining the equilibrium charterage in bargaining with asymmetric impatience. The result can be contributed to suggest the equilibrium charterage with surplus payoffs as the ratio of both of the charterer’s and the ship-owner’s delay loss cost per ton in the current market.

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Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience in a Game Theory Framework

No. Panggil

ATC LO SUH t

Penerbit

Korea : ., 2010

Deskripsi Fisik

16 p.

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

LO

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

online resource

Edisi

Volume 26 Number 2 December 2010 pp. 247-261

Subjek

Ore Transactions1
Equilibrium charterage
Rubinstein theorem in charter
delay cost per day
Charterage with game theory

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Sang-cheol SUH2

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

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